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STUDENT COMMENTS
EXPANDING LIMITATIONS ON PREJUDGMENT
ATTACHMENT: REVERBERATIONS OF
SNIADACH V. FAMILY
FINANCE CORP.
State statutes permitting prejudgment attachment or seizure of
an allegedly defaulting debtor's property have traditionally afforded
creditors a convenient means of securing their claims pending an
actual adjudication on the merits. However, in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,' there
have been a number of challenges to the constitutionality of such
statutes. In Sniadach, the Court declared the Wisconsin wage garnish-
ment statute unconstitutional because it authorized garnishment of
a debtor's wages without affording him either adequate notice or a
prior opportunity to be heard.2 In striking down the statute, the Court
declared:
Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no
extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior
hearing this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the
fundamental principles of due process. 8 (Citations omitted.)
In the course of its opinion the Court also placed considerable empha-
sis upon the fact that "wages [are] a specialized type of property
presenting distinct problems in our economic system," and that the
summary deprivation of such property often imposes "tremendous
hardships" on wage earners with families to support." While the
Court observed that summary procedures might be reconciled with
procedural due process in "extraordinary situations," it noted that
"in the present case no situation requiring special protection to a state
or creditor interest is presented by the facts, nor is the Wisconsin
statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition."'
In addition to prejudgment garnishment provisions such as that
involved in Sniadach, there are, in most states, a variety of other types
of prejudgment attachment provisions which allow creditors to attach
1 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2 Id. at 342. See generally Comment, Prejudgment Wage Garnishment: Notice and
Hearing Requirements Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 11 B.C. Ind. & Com.
L. Rev. 462 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
8 395 U.S. at 342.
4 Id. at 340.
3 Id.
Id. at 339. For a discussion of the implications of this language in the Court's
opinion see Comment, supra note 2, at 474-75.
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or replevy chattels, such as furniture and automobiles, 7 or to seize
property in satisfaction of rental arrearagess or lodging charges,° or
to levy attachment on property when initiating a lawsuit." Generally,
these statutes authorize the creditor to secure a writ of replevin or
attachment after filing an appropriate affidavit" - and posting the
required bond." The writ thus obtained directs a peace officer to
seize or otherwise impound the specified asset.' 8 Once the writ is
executed, the debtor is deprived of the use of his property until there
has been a judgment on the merits.14 This comment will examine
several recent decisions which, in interpreting such statutes, have
extended the Sniadach rationale beyond the context of wage garnish-
ment and have declared state statutes permitting prejudgment attach-
ment of certain other forms of property to be unconstitutional. The
bases for federal jurisdiction in cases challenging the constitutionality
of state prejudgment attachment statutes will be discussed and the
suggestion will be made that all state prejudgment attachment statutes
which fail to afford the debtor adequate notice and a prior hearing
contravene the requirements of procedural due process and should be
abolished.
See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. tit. 6, §§ 78.01 to .21 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1970);
N.Y. CPLR §1 7101 to 7112 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1970); Gen. Stat.
§§ 1-472 to -484 (1969); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 23-2301 to -2328 (1955); Wis. Stat.
Ann. §.§ 265.01 to .13 (1957). In this connection, § 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, now enacted in 49 states, authorizes a secured party, upon default by a debtor,
to seize chattels in which he has a security interest without resort to judicial process so
long as a breach of the peace is avoided. See discussion in note 119 infra.
8 See discussion of the Texas "landlord's Ilen" law infra at p. 706.
° See discussion of the California "innkeeper's lien" law infra at pp. 705-06.
10 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 246, §§ 1-83 (1959), as amended, (Supp.
1970). Under these provisions prejudgment attachment of property may be accomplished
by a device known as "trustee process."
11 Generally the affidavit must specify:
1. The identification of the chattel in question;
2, The facts alleged as entitling the plaintiff to possession of the chattel;
3. That the chattel is wrongfully detained by the named defendant;
4. The estimated value of the chattel; and
5. Whether or not an action for recovery of the chattel has been commenced.
See, e.g,, N.Y. CPLR § 7102(c) (McKinney 1963); Gen. Stat. N.C. § 1.473 (1969);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-2304 (1955). Point 5 listed above, which requires the plaintiff to
state whether or not an action for recovery of the chattel has been commenced is based
upon the long-standing rule that replevin is an ancillary remedy and must be supported
by an ongoing action. See Jarman v. Ward, 67 N.C. 32, 33 (1872).
12 The amount of the bond is generally at least twice the value of the chattel as
stated in the plaintiff's affidavit. See, e.g., N.Y. CPLR § 7102(e) (McKinney 1963). A
defendant debtor in order to retain the chattel would then have to post a bond of
similar amount, See, e.g., N.Y. CPLR § 7103(a) (McKinney 1963) and the additional
statutes cited in note 7 supra.
18 See the representative statutes cited in note 7 supra.
14 In some states if the debtor possesses , sufficient resources to post a bond he may
secure release of the property pending adjudication of the creditor's claim. See, e.g.,
N.Y. CPLR § 7103(a) (McKinney 1963); Gen. Stat. N.C. § 1-478 (1969); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 265.06 (1957). It is highly unlikely, however, that low-income debtors, against
whom these summary procedures are generally invoked, would possess the financial re-
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I. APPLICATION OF THE SNIADACH RATIONALE TO
REPLEVIN STATUTES
The issues present in Sniadach, both constitutional—in terms of
procedural due process—and social—in terms of balancing the legiti-
mate interests of the debtor with those of the business community—
arise in a variety of contexts beyond that' of wage garnishment. Typi-
cal of such contexts, and closely analogous to garnishment, are situa-
tions in which a creditor, invoking the provisions of a state replevin
statute, has a peace officer seize possession of specified property from
an allegedly defaulting debtor, prior to any formal adjudication of the
creditor's claim.
A recent case involving an attack on the constitutionality of a
typical state replevin statute is Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 15
in which a three-judge federal panel was convened pursuant to 28
U.S.C., Section 2281 16
 to hear the plaintiff's complaint that she was in
immediate danger of being deprived of her property by the defendants,
acting under color of the allegedly unconstitutional provisions of
Article 71 of the New York Civil Practite Law and Rules, the New
York replevin provisions." Defendant Raymours Furniture Co. (Ray-
mours) had initiated an action to regain possession of a number of
items of furniture, including a bed, box-spring and mattress, from
plaintiff Laprease. Laprease filed suit in federal district court seeking
to enjoin Raymours and the city marshals from seizing these items
and enforcing the New York replevin provisions. Laprease contended
that the provisions were unconstitutional in that they authorized a
search and seizure without a warrant in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments; that they violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by permitting the seizure of property
prior to notice and hearing; and that they violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against
those financially unable to post the required bond in order to retain
possession of the chattels pending adjudication of the case. 18 In
granting judgment for Laprease and enjoining the defendants from
implementing any of the provisions of Article 71, the three-judge
federal panel accepted Laprease's theory that a prejudgment seizure
of chattels in a replevin action without duly-issued judicial process
violated both the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amend-
ment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth
sources necessary to post the required bond. Consequently, the poor must await an
adjudication on the merits before there can be any realistic possibility of regaining
possession of the property.
15
 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
15 28 U.S.C. § 2281 is excerpted on p. 720 infra.
17 N.Y. CPLR §§ 7101 to 7112 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
18 315 F. Supp. at 720.
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Amendment." The court qualified its holding by stating: "We do not
hold or intend to intimate that nothing less than a full adversary
evidentiary hearing prior to seizure, will comport with the require-
ments of procedural due process."" However, the court declared that
the provisions of Article 71 which allowed a sheriff to use force to enter
a building or enclosure in order to seize the chattel" were "unconstitu-
tional on their face, void and unenforceable."'" Its reasoning was that
a search without a warrant is "presumptively unreasonable," and
that the Fourth Amendment is "a basic protection available to all, in
matters both civil and criminal." 23 The Laprease court analogized the
status of furniture in question to the wages in the Sniadach case and
concluded that to be deprived of the use and enjoyment of such
property for a theoretical minimum of four days (assuming the
alleged debtor could post a bond) would constitute a burden com-
parable to deprivation of wages for a like period of time." The court
emphasized that "procedural due process requires that notice and an
opportunity to be heard be provided the alleged debtor before his
property is seized pursuant to Article 71, or at least that the creditor
present to a judicial officer the circumstances justifying summary
action."' (Emphasis in original.) The Laprease court stressed that
in the usual case dealing with a party filing an affidavit, the party "has
established no entitlement, except such as he has unilaterally de-
clared unto himself. 720
An earlier challenge to the same New York provisions, brought
in the state courts on similar grounds by one of the successful plain-
tiffs in Laprease, had been summarily rebuffed by the New York
Supreme Court in Lawson v. Mante11. 27 The court in that case dis-
tinguished Sniadach on both factual and statutory grounds and con-
cluded:
Finally, it must be noted that a careful reading of the
Sniadach decision indicates that the same is inapplicable to
the instant controversy upon its own wordage. Justice
Douglas in his majority opinion noted: "A procedural rule
that may satisfy due process for attachments in general .. .
does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every
case . . . . We deal here with wages—a specialized type of
12 Id. at 725. The court refused to comment on the equal protection claim. It pre-
'erred to base its finding of unconstitutionality on the previously cited grounds.
20 Id.
21 See N.Y. CPLR § 7110 (McKinney 1963).
22 315 F. Supp. at 725.
28 Id. at 722.
24 Id.
20 Id. at 724.
20 Id. at 723.
2T 62 Miscad 307, 306 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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property presenting distinct problems in our economic sys-
tem."28
In extending the Sniadach rationale to the replevin context, however,
the Laprease case implicitly rejects the narrow reading accorded
Sniadach by the New York Supreme Court in Lawson. Concomitantly,
however, the Laprease decision raises intriguing questions concerning
whether, and to what extent, the due process requirements of adequate
notice and prior hearing may be applicable to the gamut of prejudg-
ment attachment provisions. For example, the due process issues
present in Laprease are also present when the creditor himself seizes
property of the debtor, under color of such "self-help" provisions as
Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which authorizes
nonjudicial repossession by a secured party;" or "landlord's lien"
statutes which allow a landlord to seize a tenant's property without
judicial process in order to secure payment of alleged rental arrear-
ages; 3° and "innkeeper's lien" statutes which afford a similar privilege
to hotel owners who wish to secure claims for lodging costs against
guests.'
IL DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS IN PREJUDGMENT
ATTACHMENT SITUATIONS
Difficulties arise both in determining the initial applicability of
the Sniadach decision to state prejudgment attachment statutes deal-
ing with property other than wages, and in ascertaining the extent
to which the due process requirements of notice and hearing should
be applied to such statutes. One source of difficulty is the question
of whether qualitative distinctions should be made between the types
of property subjected to seizure. The Laprease decision focused upon
the prejudgment attachment of personal property, in contrast to
Sniadach, which was concerned with garnishment of wages. Laprease
thus represents a significant development in view of the language in
Sniadach characterizing the wages involved as "a specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system."" This
language could be viewed as raising the question of whether the
Sniadach holding was limited to garnishment, or enunciated a broader
rule requiring adherence to due process requirements in cases involv-
ing prejudgment seizure of other types of property. Secondly, even
assuming that Sniadach is susceptible to broader interpretation, the
28 62 Misc.2d at 309, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
20 see generally Comment, Non-Judicial Repossession—Reprisal in Need of Re-
form, 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 435 (1970). The only restrictions on this process
appear to be that the debtor be in default and that the secured party avoid a "breach
of the peace" (U.C.C. 11 9-503).
80 See, e.g., Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5238a (Supp. 1969). See generally discussion
infra at p. 706.
81 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code	 1861 (West Supp. 1969). See generally discussion
infra at pp. 705-06.
32 395 U.S. at 340.
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question arises whether a debtor may validly "contract away" his
constitutional rights to notice and a prior hearing through a clause in
a retail installment sales contract or some similar document. These
issues have both been considered in post-Sniadach cases.
A. The Question of Whether Sniadach is Restricted
to Garnishment Situations
Consonant with the rationale upon which the court in Laprease
proceeded, some federal courts have 'found little difficulty in applying
the principles set forth in Sniadach to situations involving the pre-
judgment seizure of property other than wages, thus interpreting
Sniadach as mandating a broad application of the due process require-
ments of "notice" and "hearing." In, Klim v. Jones," for example, an
action was brought in Federal District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California seeking damages, injunctive relief, and a declara-
tory judgment that California Civil Code Section 1861, popularly
known as the "innkeeper's lien" law, was unconstitutional in that it
permitted the taking of property without due process of law.
In essence, the statute granted an innkeeper a lien upon the
"baggage or other personal property" of a guest to secure payment
of "proper charges due" for room and board. The statute specifically
authorized peaceable entry of the guest's room between the hours
of sunrise and sunset in order to seize such property and expressly
declared the use of a passkey to be peaceable. Once he had gained
possession of the guest's property, the innkeeper could retain posses-
sion until the charges were paid or, after a period of 60 days had
elapsed, he could sell the property at a public auction and apply the
proceeds in satisfaction of the claim. In accordance with this statute,
the defendant padlocked the plaintiff's hotel room thereby effectively
attaching all of the plaintiff's personal belongings which were in the
room. The court noted that the common law principle of allowing
the innkeeper a lien on the property of his guest developed in con-
junction with the innkeeper's absolute liability for insuring the safety
of his guest from highwaymen and outlaws. In view of the paucity of
modern-day highwaymen, the court concluded that "to whatever
extent a summary procedure was necessary to make the innkeeper's
lien equal in scope to his potential liability, that liability has been so
reduced as to no longer call for such a draconian approach as dictated
by section 18612'34
 Accordingly, the court determined that the
statute, "as presently drawn, is violative of the constitutional guaran-
tee of due process of law as outlined in the Sniadach case."" As in the
Laprease case, the Klim court noted that being deprived of one's
belongings constituted a burden comparable to that recognized by
the Sniadach court in situations involving deprivation of wages. In
33 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
84 Id. at 121.
" Id.
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fact, the Klim court emphasized that there was even more hardship
involved under the "innkeeper's lien" statute because "all of the
boarder's possessions may be denied him if such possessions are all
kept in his lodgings." 36 The Klim court also could find no "overriding
state or creditor interest," as expressed in Sniadach," which would
justify retention of section 1861.33
 Consequently, the court chose to
regard Sniadach as "standing inescapably on constitutional principles,"
and declared section 1861 "constitutionally infirm under Sniadach
for its failure to provide for any sort of hearing prior to the imposition
of the innkeeper's lien thereunder.""
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Hall v.
Garson," recently considered an appeal from a district court's dismissal
of the plaintiff's class action challenging the constitutionality of a Texas
statute popularly known as the "landlord's lien" law!' The statute
allowed a landlord to secure a claim against a tenant for alleged
rental arrearages by the preemptive seizure of property found on the
rented premises. In reversing and remanding for further proceedings
in the district court, the court of appeals carefully noted that while
it would not pass upon the merits of the claim, the constitutionality of
the landlord's lien statute would depend upon "whether there exists
an extraordinary circumstance that would justify the summary sei-
zure" authorized by the statute!' The court recognized that the
landlord's lien procedure exhibited the same characteristics as were
found objectionable by the Supreme Court in Sniadach, namely, that
property could be seized by the landlord without notice of a prior
hearing. Moreover, the court observed that the statute seemed "only
to protect the landlord's interest, and not any broader public inter-
est."43 It intimated that, in the absence of some showing that a com-
pelling public interest was being served, the statute would fail for
lack of compliance with fundamental due process requirements. How-
ever, whether or not such unusual conditions could be shown, the
sweeping language of the Texas statute grants a landlord virtually
unfettered license to impound a tenant's property without notice of
a prior hearing, no matter how trivial or tenuous the claim. Accord-
ingly, it is submitted that the statute, as presently drawn, should be
held unconstitutional since it is not "narrowly drawn to meet .. .
[such] unusual condition [s]" as expressed by the Supreme Court in
Sniadach."
86 Id. at 123.
si See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). The relevant
language of the opinion is also excerpted on p. 700 supra.
38
 315 F. Supp. at 124.
89 Id. at 122.
40 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
41 Tex. Civ. - Stat. Ann. art. 5238a (Supp. 1969):
42 430 F.2d at 441.
43 Id.
44 See the quotation excerpted on p. 700 supra.
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A number of state court decisions have also viewed the constitu-
tional impact of Sniadach as extending to areas beyond wage garnish-
ment situations. In Larson v. Fetherston," the plaintiff, acting under
the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute, attached two bank
accounts of a debtor travel agency. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
stated that Sniadach is not restricted merely to wages, and that "no
valid distinction can be made between garnishment of wages and that
of other property."4° The court quoted the broad language in
Sniadach to the effect that ". . . the sole question is whether there has
been a taking of property without that procedural due process that is
required by the Fourteenth Amendment. .. 2' 47 The court further
stated that "a due process violation should not depend upon the type
of property being subjected to the procedure.''
By way of contrast, some state courts, such as the New York
Supreme Court in Lawson v. Mantell," discussed earlier, have indi-
cated a reluctance to extend Sniadach beyond the context of wage
garnishment. Such a case is Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court of
Maricopa County," in which the Supreme Court of Arizona considered
a challenge to that state's prejudgment garnishment law. The lower
court had entered an order requiring that the clerk of court should
not issue writs of garnishment or attachment of other forms of
property unless it was first shown that there had been a hearing on
the merits of the claim against the alleged debtor. The Supreme Court
of Arizona affirmed the portion of the lower court's order dealing
specifically with wages. However, the court modified the order as it
applied to property other than wages, stating:
We emphasize, however, that our holding is limited to
the prejudgment garnishment of wages (as was the opinion
of Sniadach). In this regard, Termplan maintains that the
Court below went beyond the scope of the Sniadach opinion
when it ruled that the procedure therein must be followed in
attachments and garnishment of property other than wages.
We agree . . . ." (Emphasis in original.)
Notwithstanding this tendency on the part of some state courts to
accord Sniadach a narrow interpretation, restricting its requirements
solely to garnishment of wages, the decisions in Laprease, Hall and
Klim, discussed earlier, suggest that the judicial trend in ihe federal
courts is towards a broad application of the Sniadach principles to
prejudgment attachment statutes affecting all types of property. If, in
45 44 Wis.2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
48 Id. at 718, 172 N.W.2d at 23.
47 Id. at 717, 172 N.W.2d at 23.
48 Id. at 718, 172 N.W.2d at 23.
48 62 Misc.2d 307, 306 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1969). See discussion on pp. 703-04
supra.
80 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969).
81 Id. at	 463 P.2d at 70.
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light of these federal decisions, it is desired to retain prejudgment
attachment statutes, the problem remains of providing realistic ad-
ministrative procedures which will satisfy due process requirements.
B. The Problem of Devising Administrative Procedures to
Satisfy the Requirements of Sniadach
Given the judicial trend towards a broad interpretation of
Sniadach, the incorporation of the constitutional requirements of
notice and a prior hearing into the existing framework of typical state
prejudgment attachment procedures will foreseeably pose enormous
administrative problems for the courts. In attempting to devise
efficient procedures designed to alleviate these problems, reference
might profitably be made to other administrative contexts in which
deference to due process plays a significant role. One such context
might be the administrative process involved in determining eligibility
for public assistance. The recent Supreme Court decision in Goldberg
v. Kelly" focused upon the question of whether termination of public
assistance to a recipient without providing a prior opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing violated procedural due process." The Court in
Goldberg reiterated the precept that "the fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard," and that "[t]he hear-
ing must be 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' "54
To translate these legal principles into workable administrative pro-
cedures, however, is a major problem. Justice Harlan, concurring in
Sniadach, pointed out that the concept of "deprivation of property"
includes deprivation of the use of such property during the period
preceding an adjudication on the merits, and that "due process is
afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which are aimed
at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the
underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived
of his property or its unrestricted use."" (Emphasis in original.) As
the Court in Goldberg noted with respect to public assistance pay-
ments, the "termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources,
his situation becomes immediately desperate."" (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) Similarly, the fact that a hearing on the merits may ultimately
result in a decision in favor of the debtor is of little consolation if, in
the meantime, he has had to live without his furniture or other
property.
None of the decisions dealing with the due process issue, however,
attempt to delineate a concrete application of the concepts of "notice"
52 397 -U.S. 254 (1970).
53 Id. at 255.
54 Id. at 267.
55 395 U.S. at 343 (concurring opinion).
56 397 U.S. at 264.
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and "hearing." The Goldberg Court, which was dealing with a
uniquely governmental activity, reasoned that "what procedures due
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action!'" Moreover, the Court stressed the importance
of not imposing upon the states any procedural requirements beyond
those demanded by "rudimentary due process."' Judicial review of
state prejudgment attachment statutes and findings of constitutional
deficiencies based upon lack of adequate notice and hearing provisions
illustrate the pragmatic problem of ascertaining what specific due
process standards should be employed, for example, in evaluating a
replevin statute. What would be a reasonable period of notice to the
alleged debtor and to what extent should his hearing before the court
be of an adversarial or evidentiary nature? If one concludes that a
hearing should include even a cursory examination of the merits, then
the prejudgment proceeding might well become a mini-adjudication of
the claim. The cumulative effect of conducting detailed proceedings in
every case in which prejudgment attachment is sought to be invoked
would be the imposition of enormous burdens, both administrative and
financial, upon state judicial systems."
In view of this alarming prospect it is perhaps not inappropriate
to raise the very basic question of whether the state should, in the
absence of some compelling public interest, be involved in the pre-
judgment seizure of property at all. One simple solution to the due
process problem would be the abolition of all statutes which allow
prejudgment seizure or attachment of property. Without such stat-
utes, creditors would have to opt either to seek a private settlement of
their claims without benefit of the enormous economic leverage af-
forded by such statutes, or to proceed through the courts to seek a
judgment on the merits. This solution assumes that the debtor's con-
stitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
and his right not to be deprived of his property without due process
of law, are absolute rights which cannot unwittingly be lost by signing
some kind of standard form contract. This assumption, however, is
not always valid.
67 Id. at 263.
as Id, at 267.
69 In addition to the sheer magnitude of, the administrative burden involved, other
and related problems might also arise. As Justice Black observed in his dissenting opin-
ion in Goldberg, the concept of a "meaningful" hearing for most low-income persons
necessarily adumbrates an additional requiretUent that counsel be appointed to assist
them at such a hearing:
[Tioday's decision requires only the opportunity to have the benefit of counsel
at the administrative hearing, but it is difficult to believe that the same reason-
ing process would not require the appointment of counsel, for otherwise the
right to counsel is a meaningless one since these people are too poor to hire
their own advocates.
397 U.S. at 278-79.
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C. Contractual Waiver of Constitutional Protections
The question of whether a debtor may validly waive his constitu-
tional rights by contract, thereby rendering himself vulnerable to
summary attachment procedures, irrespective of their constitutionality
if authorized by statute, is central to any consideration of the due
process problems in attachment cases. This question was considered
in the recent case of Fuentes v. Faircloth," in which plaintiff Fuentes
had purchased a stove and a stereo from co-defendant Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co. (Firestone) under conditional sales contracts. Deem-
ing Fuentes to be in default on her payments, Firestone sought to
repossess these items under the Florida replevin provisions." Subse-
quently, Fuentes filed suit in federal district court seeking injunctive
relief and a declaratory judgment that certain sections of the Florida
replevin provisions were unconstitutional because "they authorize a
taking of property without prior opportunity to be heard in contra-
vention of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and they authorize a search and seizure without the necessity of a
search warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment."" The court
felt that neither Sniadach nor Goldberg applied since both dealt with
"special types of property" not found in the situation before the
court. The main thrust of the court's opinion, however, centered upon
its finding that none of the prior cases dealing with the due process
problem addressed themselves to the enforcement of a contractual
agreement specifically granting the creditor the right to recover the
property in question without a prior hearing if the debtor was deemed
to be in default. The Fuentes court thus accorded great weight to
the contractual arrangement between the parties, and implicitly af-
firmed that constitutional protections may validly be waived by
contract. The security agreement in question provided that in the
event of "default of any payments," the seller might elect to repossess
the collateral. The plaintiff in Fuentes admitted delinquency in pay-
ments but claimed that she had a meritorious defense. However, the
court felt that the admission of delinquency was conclusive on the
question of the seller's right to repossess. The statute authorized an
officer executing a writ of replevin to ". . . publicly demand delivery
[of the property], and if the same be not delivered by the defendant
or some other person, he [the officer] shall cause such house, building
or enclosure to be broken open. . . ."" Since there was no showing
that a forcible entry had been employed, the Fuentes court refused to
rule this provision prima facie unconstitutional and void as the
Laprease court had done." Instead, the court interpreted the replevin
statute as falling within the situations outlined in Sniadach in which
00 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 91 S. Ct. 893 (1971).
01 Fla. Stat. Ann. $ 78.01 to .21 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
62 317 F. Sapp, at 956.
63 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.10 (1964).
04 See discussion on pp. 702-03 supra.
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prejudgment seizure of goods without a prior hearing is permissible,"
particularly in situations involving a specific contractual provision
authorizing the seizure in order to protect a security interest." It
stated that "the essence of the contract in issue here is that one party
may enter the premises of the other (whether by himself or through
an officer who is executing a writ of replevin) in order to repossess
property in which he has an interest."" The court argued that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit parties to a conditional sales
contract from contracting for peaceable repossession.
This approach, however, seemingly disregards what should be the
central issue—the right of a person not to be summarily deprived of
his property without due process of law. Certainly parties may con-
tract and include the right to repossession as one of the remedies for
default, but it does not necessarily follow that this consent may not
be withdrawn by the debtor at any time, subject to liability for con-
tract damages. The legitimacy of the state's involvement in the
enforcement of such provisions is dubious at best. In situations
involving "self-help" remedies, public policy should militate, in the
first instance, against encouraging enforcement devices which contain
the inherent risk of exciting violent reactions or other breaches of the
peace." Moreover, a satisfactory resolution of private contract dis-
putes which are not settled informally is best achieved through an
orderly adjudication of the underlying issues, and any involvement
by the state prior to such an adjudication should be in strict confor-
mity with the dictates of due process. The assertion that a debtor may
freely waive his constitutional right to due process, by signing a typi-
cal installment sales contract, ignores the practical realities surround-
ing such transactions. Rarely is the debtor aware of the existence of
the provision in the contract, nor is it likely that he would have a
full appreciation of its legal significance if he were aware of it. Finally,
even assuming that he were aware of it and objected to it he would
most likely be told either to sign the contract in its present form or
to take his business elsewhere.
66 The Sniadach Court cited a number of "extraordinary situations . . . requiring
special protection to a state or creditor interest." These included: a situation in which
a conservator took possession of a failing bank, Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947);
summary seizure of foods determined by the Federal Security Administrator to be dan-
gerous to the public health, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950);
attachment of property of a non-resident debtor where the possibility of obtaining in
personam jurisdiction was minimal, Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) ; and a
situation in which the State Superintendent of Banks levied execution upon a failing
bank's shareholders in order to protect the interests of depositors, Coffin Bros. v. Ben-
nett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928). See Comment, Prejudgment Wage Garnishment: Notice and
Hearing Requirements Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn.
L. Rev. 462, 474-75 (1970).
ce 317 F. Supp. at 958.
67 Id.
" See generally Comment, Non-Judicial Repossession—Reprisal in Need of Re-
form, 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 435, 440-49 (1970).
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The Fuentes decision relied upon Brunswick Carp. v. J&P,
Inc.," as authority for permitting the contractual modification of
constitutional rights. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the vendor's acts of repossession and subsequent
sale of the property to satisfy its claim were authorized by the sales
contract and the applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, and that the vendees who admitted that they were in default
on the conditional sale ". . . cannot now be heard to object to the
default procedures they agreed to simply because Brunswick did
utilize the legal process of replevin under bond." 7° Accordingly, the
Brunswick court concluded that Sniadach was inapplicable to the
situation at bar:
Furthermore, we find no merit in appellants' additional
contention that under the recent Supreme Court case of
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct.
1820, 23 L.Ed. 2d 349 (1969) they have been the victims of
a taking of property without the procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendinent. Sniadach expressly
was a unique case involving, "a specialized type of property
presenting distinct problems in our economic system." That
case involved wage garnishment without notice or hearing
prior to judgment on a promissory note. It is not in the least
comparable to the case here on appeal involving enforcement
of a security interest. Appellants have contractually agreed
that upon default, their creditor Brunswick "* * * may take
immediate possession of said property [collateral] and for
this purpose the Seller may enter the premises where said
property may be and remove the same without notice or
without legal process; thereupon all the rights and interests
of the Buyer to and in said property shall terrninate.' 71
The restrictive view of Sniadach reflected in the Brunswick
decision and adopted in Fuentes has not enjoyed uniform acceptance
in the courts. The Laprease court, for example, distinguished Bruns-
wick on the grounds that in Laprease there was no admission of
default, while implicit in the Brunswick holding was a finding of
waiver of constitutional rights and consent to the seizure by reason
of the admission of default by the defendants." The Laprease court,
69 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
70 Id. at 105.
71 Id.
72 It is questionable whether the mere existence of the various "default" clauses
relied on in Fuentes and Brunswick should be allowed to justify the wholesale surrender
of constitutional rights. The concept of "default" is somewhat elusive, and a number of
authorities have pointed out that the circumstances which constitute a default are a
matter for contractual agreement between the parties. See, e.g., Whisenhunt v. Allen
Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 818, 168 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1969); Hogan, The Secured
Party and Default Proceedings Under the U.C.C., 47 Minn. L. Rev. 205, 209 (1962);
712
EXPANDING LIMITATIONS ON PREJUDGEMENT ATTACHMENT
however, questioned whether "the fine print in the usual consumer's
conditional sales contract gives rise to a competent and intelligent
waiver of a constitutional right."" The dissenting opinion in Fuentes
urged that one signing a contract does not waive his constitutional
rights and that "[NAT-len the state authorizes the forcible entry of a
person's house prior to the establishment of the probable validity of
a creditor's claim, it contravenes the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 74
 The constitutionality of prejudgment at-
tachment statutes facilitating the unilateral settlement of claims must
be measured in terms of the due process requirements that have
always limited and restrained governmental authority. To imply that
contractual waivers legitimize otherwise unconstitutional procedures
is to misconceive the central issue involved—the constitutional limita-
tions on state activity which directly, affect individual rights.
In contrast to Fuentes, which readily accepts the concept of
contractual waiver of constitutional rights, is a recent Pennsylvania
decision which imposes a strong burden of proof upon a party seeking
to enforce such a waiver. In Swarb v. Lennox," a class action was
brought in federal district court challenging the Pennsylvania pro-
cedures permitting the recording and execution of judgments by
confession." A three-judge federal panel found that in order for the
statute to comply with due process standards, there must be a showing
that there had been an intelligent and voluntary consent by the debtor
signing a contract containing such a clause;" otherwise, the effect of
the Pennsylvania procedure would be a denial of "notice" and "hear-
ing" prior to judgment. 78 The court declared the Pennsylvania prac-
SquilTante, Commercial Code Review, 74 Corn. L.J. 17 (1969). In any event, it is sub-
mitted that, contrary to the view expressed in Fuentes and Brunswick, default provisions
do not, a fortiori, preclude the assertion of one's constitutional rights.
75 315 F. Supp, at 724.
74 317 F. Supp. at 959.
75 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
78
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 1482 III (1962); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 738 (Supp.
1970); Pa, Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1970); Pa. Rules of Civil Procedure 2950-
2976. "Judgment by confession" has been defined as:
Judgment where a defendant gives the plaintiff a cognovit or written confession
of the action by virtue of which the plaintiff enters judgment. The act of a
debtor in permitting judgment to be entered against him by his creditor, for a
stipulated sum, by a written statement to that effect or by warrant of attorney,
without the institution of legal proceedings of any kind .. • .
Black's Law Dictionary 978 (4th rev. ed. 1968). It is common practice on the part of
creditors in some states to include as a matter' of course in their "standard form" con-
sumer contracts, clauses authorizing the creditor or his attorney to "confess judgment"
against the debtor if the debtor is deemed to be In default.
77 314 F. Supp. at 1095.
78
 Id. at 1095. The court described the mechanics of the Pennsylvania procedures
being challenged as follows:
The Pennsylvania procedure challenged in this suit permits a debtor to sign an
agreement containing a clause authorizing the Prothonotary, court clerk, or any
attorney to appear in any court, at any time, to confess judgment against the
debtor for any unpaid portion of the debt along with various fees and charges.
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tice of entering judgments by confession to be unconstitutional and
enjoined the named defendants from entering any judgments by
confession against members of the designated class. The court, how-
ever, expressly limited the scope of its holding to consumer trans-
actions involving natural Pennsylvania citizens whose income is less
than $10,000 a year. 79 The decision reiterated the principle that "there
is no presumption that a person acquiesces in the waiver of his consti-
tutional rights.'"° The court, citing the Sniadach case, found that
absent "an understanding and voluntary consent" by the debtor to
submit to judgment by confession, the , Pennsylvania procedure vio-
lated the due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to the entry of judgmental. Consequently, it ruled that
the burden is on the creditor to prove that the debtor understood the
legal significance of signing a contract containing a confession clause.s 2
The court refrained from stating precisely what procedural devices
should be utilized by those wishing to employ confession of judgment
clauses. It was suggested, however, that due process requirements
might be met through the use of affidavits showing that the party had
intentionally and intelligently signed the contracts' It is submitted
that even the use of affidavits would be readily susceptible to abuse
by those parties who draft the standard-form consumer contracts
containing such confession clauses. 84 However, as suggested earlier,
it is foreseeable that even a full appreciation for the import of such
clauses would be of little assistance to persons in an unequal bargain-
ing position who are told either to "sign or forget" the purchase. In
The burdens of establishing a defense imposed upon a defaulting debtor who
has signed a contract containing a confession of judgment clause and against
whom judgment has been entered are greater than those faced by the typical
debtor. The judgment entered as a result of a confession clause has the same
force and effect as any other judgment, i.e., it acts as a lien upon the debtor's
presently owned property and on after acquired property if the judgment is
revived in the case of real property or is executed upon in the case of personal
property.
Id. at 1094.
79 Id. at 1102.
89 Id. at 1100.
81 Id. at 1095.
82 Id. at 1103.
83 Id. at 1100 n.24.
84 The Swarb court accorded full recognition to the realities underlying the typical
consumer transaction. In this connection the court noted:
Over 30 years ago Professor Llewellyn wrote ("Book Reviews, the Standard-
ization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law. By 0. Praus-
nitz," 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700 (1939)):
". . , contract ceases to be matter of dicker, bargain by bargain, and item by
item and becomes . , a matter of mass production of bargain, with the back-
ground (apart from price, quantity and the like) filled in not by the general
law but by standard clauses and terms prepared often by one of the parties
only.. .
Id. at 1099 n.19. See also the quotations excerpted by the court in nn.20-22 of the
opinion.
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essence, the assertion that numerous methods are available in order
to demonstrate the intelligent waiver of such rights ignores the obvious
fact that no party except one without equal bargaining power would
ever sign a note which subjects him to such drastic penalties. In the
final analysis, it is relatively easy for creditors to fabricate the ap-
pearance of intelligent waiver through judicious application of their
bargaining superiority in transactions involving low-income consumers.
The rejection of the due process argument in Fuentes appears to
conflict with the underlying rationale of the Laprease decision. More-
over, the Fuentes discussion of contractual obligation seems to bypass
the point made in Swarb—that a formidable burden of proof must be
sustained in showing that an individual, particularly a person of
limited education and means, has intelligently waived his constitu-
tional rights. The replevin provisions sustained in Fuentes facilitated
the summary seizure of chattels by a creditor who conceivably could
not have sustained the standard of proof of intelligent waiver required
by Swarb. As a result, the Fuentes decision conditions the enforce-
ability of a replevin procedure, which the Laprease court would very
likely hold to be unconstitutional, upon the comparative bargaining
power of contracting parties. Additional litigation may well be re-
quired to resolve the apparently conflicting views of due process
evidenced in the Fuentes and Laprease decisions, and to delineate
precisely the extent to which private contracts may modify the basic
guarantees of procedural due process.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL BASES FOR ATTACKING
PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS IN FEDERAL COURT
Laprease and a number of other cases challenging state statutes
permitting prejudgment attachment have been brought in the federal
courts." The plaintiffs in these cases have invoked a number of
statutes as bases for federal jurisdiction. The particular constitu-
tional claim, the relief sought, and the degree of involvement on the
part of the state are important factors in determining whether federal
jurisdiction may be obtained.
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as Bases for
Federal Jurisdiction
The contentions most frequently advanced by plaintiffs challeng-
ing prejudgment attachment provisions are predicated upon the indi-
vidual's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure and his right not to be deprived of property without due process
of law. Title 42 of the U.S. Code, Section 1983, creates a civil cause of
action for the deprivation of constitutional rights. This statute pro-
vides:
85
 The claims could, of course, have been brought in state court as well, but ap-
parently the federal courts are favored as a forum where the primary issues raised
involve constitutional issues.
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
It has recently been stated that two elements are necessary for
recovery under section 1983; the plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and that the defendant deprived him of this
constitutional right "under color of law." 86 Title 28 of the U.S. Code,
Section 1343, is the jurisdictional statute under which the federal
district courts are given original jurisdiction to hear suits predicated
upon Title 42 of the U.S. Code, Section 1983. This provision states,
in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any
person:
. . . .
(3) To redress the deprivation under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States.
The officers executing the writs of replevin in the Laprease and
Fuentes cases were clearly representatives of the state acting pursuant
to the statute and consequently within the necessary concept of "state
action" and "under color of state law" required by both the Four-
teenth Amendment and the statute just quoted. However, a more
difficult situation is presented in cases involving private individuals
who are acting on their own initiative, but in a manner prescribed
and authorized by a state statute. The Hall and Klim cases, for ex-
ample, concerned private acts of landlords and innkeepers who had
unilaterally seized property of the respective plaintiffs. The appli-
cability of section 1983 to such acts by private individuals requires an
analysis of the precise meaning of the phrase "under color of any
state law" as used in the statute. The, court, after noting that
action by state officials is generally "under color of" state law, focused
upon the problems arising when section 1983 is sought to be applied
to conduct falling within the "gray area" between solely state and
80 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 130 (1910), revig 409 F.2d 121 (2d
Cir. 1968).
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"solely private action. The court observed that private conduct may
also be covered under the section if a sufficient involvement with the
state is shown." On this point, the court quoted from United States v.
Price,88
 in which the following statement appears:
Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the
prohibited action, are acting "under color" of law for pur-
poses of the statute. To act "under color" of law does not
require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is
enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with
the State or its agents."
In Reitman v. Mulkey," the Supreme Court declared that the broad
meaning of "state involvement" can even encompass situations in
which the only involvement on the part of the state is the enactment
of the statute in question by the legislature." The Court in that case
went on to say that state involvement violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment could exist where the state's function was only to en-
courage, rather than to command, the alleged unconstitutional action
through the enactment of the statute."
It is apparent that the conduct of the parties acting pursuant to
state law in the Hall and Klim cases can readily be construed as
constituting "state involvement," since it was only by virtue of the
statutes in question that the individuals had the power to seize the
debtor's property. In the words of the Klim court, this was "not just
action against a backdrop of an amorphous state policy, but [was]
instead action encouraged, indeed only made possible, by explicit
state authorization."" Similarly, the Hall court said of the conduct
of the landlord who entered the tenant's apartment to seize a tele-
vision, that the act "possesses many, if not all, of the characteristics
of an act of the State." Further, that court recognized that the statute
in question "vests in the landlord and his agents authority that is
normally exercised by the state and historically has been a state func-
tion."" Arguably, any state statute permitting a party to enforce
summary procedures prior to a hearing on the merits is, in effect,
delegating a function of the state and should be open to challenge
under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Indeed, as Mr. Justice
Brennan observed in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Ca.," such statutes do,
in fact, manifest a state policy and "when private action conforms
87 315 F. Supp. at 114.
88 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
89 Id. at 794.
90
 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
91 Id. at 375.
92 Id.
93 315 F. Supp. at 114.
94 430 F.2d at 439.
95 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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with state policy, it becomes a manifestation of that policy and is
thereby drawn within the ambit of state action."a®
The argument has been made that the jurisdictional statute, 28
U.S. Code, Section 1343(3) is limited to "personal rights" and could
not be read as applying to "property rights" which are involved in
replevin and "self-help" lien statutes. The Hall decision counters this
argument by pointing out that the rights in question are not the
rights to the television, they are "the .right of the individual to be
secure in his home and free from the invasion of that home without
any prior procedure to protect his interest." 97 Moreover, as the Klim
court pointed out, most courts have either rejected the "personal rights
vs. property rights" distinction outright, or avoided its effect by
"characterizing the 'property' claim in question in terms of such non-
property concepts as denial of due process or equal protection of the
laws."'"
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1331—Federal Question Jurisdiction
A party attempting to challenge the constitutionality of a state
prejudgment attachment statue is faced with a more difficult problem
in establishing federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S. Code, Section 1331
than under the previously discussed Section 1343(3). The latter
section is narrower in scope in that it is addressed solely to unconstitu-
tional state action, in contrast to section 1331 which is addressed to
all claims, including those against the federal government, "[arising]
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 99 The
federal issue raised in the cases involving prejudgment attachment
statutes is an alleged taking of property ; without due process of law. A
major obstacle in obtaining federal jurisdiction under section 1331 is
the necessity of meeting the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement. Thus,
while Laprease and Fuentes clearly present a constitutional claim and
involve the requisite element of "state action," based upon action by
state officers, neither case appears to have involved an amount in
controversy in excess of $10,000, as required under section 1331. The
Klim case presents an exception, since there the plaintiff sought
$12,000 in damages for deprivation of personal property, interference
with employment opportunities, battery, and infliction of mental and
emotional distress. 1 °° The court in that case, however, was also faced
with the problem of ascertaining whether the hotel manager's conduct
under the statute was equivalent to "state action," because the federal
96 Id. at 203.
97 430 F.2d at 438.
99 315 F. Supp. at 115.
99 28 U.S.C. 1331(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
100 315 F. Supp. at 112.
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rights asserted by the plaintiff derived from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and some "state action" must be demonstrated in order to
sustain a claim under that amendment.'" The Klim court reasoned
that the same indicia of state action sufficient to invoke jurisdiction
under section 1983, 102 would also suffice for the purposes of section
1331. This approach comports with Mr. Justice Brennan's broad char-
acterization of "state action" in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,'" and
suggests that in future cases dealing with attachment procedures,
federal claims will be clearly presented for the purposes of section
1331 when the complaint contains allegations that the plaintiff has
been deprived of his property without due process by individuals
acting pursuant to the state prejudgment statute and that he has
sustained damages in excess of $10,000.
C. The Abstention Doctrine
It was argued before the Klim court that even if the court has
proper subject matter jurisdiction, "it should nevertheless stay its hand
and defer to the state courts of California for a determination as to the
constitutionality of California Civil Code, Section 1861.'1" This
argument is predicated upon the judicial doctrine of exhaustion of
state remedies and the federal doctrine of abstention. The former doc-
trine has been consistently rejected as a prerequisite to the mainte-
nance of actions in the federal courts under the statutes discussed
above.'" The abstention doctrine, on the other hand, is based more
upon the concept of comity than upon the requirements for jurisdic-
tion. The rationale of this doctrine is that state courts should be
permitted to adjudicate matters within their sphere of competence
thereby avoiding unnecessary federal-state friction, The abstention
doctrine has been regarded with increasing disfavor by the federal
courts and is now employed only in exceptional situations.'" In the
Hall case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the challenge to the "landlord's lien" law on the
grounds that the tenants were required to exhaust their state remedies,
was erroneous in light of one hundred years of litigation under section
1983.107 The court reiterated the Supreme Court's position that the
abstention doctrine is applicable only in those circumstances where
101 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
102 See discussion on pp. 715-16 supra.
103 398 U.S. 144, 203 (1970) (separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See quotation on pp. 717-18 supra.
104 315 F. Supp. at 117.
105 See, e.g., Damico v. California, 398 U.S. 416, 417 (1967); McNeese v. Board
of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
100 See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S: 241, 248 (1967); Allegheny County v.
Frank Mashuda Co., 36() U.S. 185, 188 (1959). A special circumstance in which absten-
tion may still be applied would be a case involving a recently enacted statute which
had not yet been interpreted by the state courts. See Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242,
244 (1953).
107 430 F.2d at 435.
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federal constitutional claims are grounded on the uncertainty created
by the "strands of local law woven into the case.'° e In examining the
landlord's lien statute, the Hall court emphasized that where "there
can be no doubt as to what state law provides, there is no place for
abstention.'" It seems apparent that there can be no question as to
the meaning and effect of most, if not all, of the procedures authorized
by state prejudgment attachment statutes. The uniform methods
sanctioned by the replevin statutes in Laprease and Fuentes defy any
interpretation which would avoid the constitutional issues raised;
consequently, the abstention doctrine should not preclude the federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction in similar cases arising in the
future. The Mina decision recognized that abstention is improper
where there is before the court no controlling question of state law,
and it found no obstacle to its passing upon the constitutionality of
the "innkeeper's lien" statute, which was neither new nor ambiguous
in its terms or applicability.110 The long history of typical state pre-
judgment attachment statutes and years of litigation defining their
limits and functions would also seem to argue against application of
the abstention doctrine in cases challenging the validity of such
statutes in federal courts.
D. Adjudication by a Three-Judge Federal Panel
The Laprease, Swarb, and Fuentes courts were all decided by
three-judge district courts convened pursuant to 28 U.S. Code, Section
2281 which provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation or execution of any State Statute by
restraining the action of any officer of such state in the en-
forcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under state
statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge
thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such
statute unless the application therefor is heard and deter-
mined by a district court of three judges under section 2284
of this title.'
The parties in an action before a threeljudge panel have the right of
direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court without the neces-
sity of intermediate review or the difficulty of obtaining the more dis-
cretionary writ of certiorari. 112 As indicated by the court in the Hall
case, a three-judge federal panel has jurisdiction only if the statute
108 Id. at 437.
109 Id.
110 315 F. Supp. at 118.
111 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964) sets forth the procedures for convening a three-judge
federal panel and prescribes the composition of the panel. See generally Currie, The
Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
112 28 U.S.C.	 1253 (1964).
720
EXPANDING LIMITATIONS ON PREJUDGEMENT ATTACHMENT
sought to be invalidated has statewide application and the injunctive
relief sought will run against a state officer." Actions involving the
constitutionality of state statutes obviously meet the first requirement,
but problems often arise in attempting to define the meaning of the
term "state officer" for purposes of section 2281. A sheriff authorized
to execute writs of replevin is clearly within the meaning of the
statutory phrase, 114 but private citizens undertaking unilateral action
pursuant to state "self-help" statutes are held not to be included.'"
Both the Klim and Hall courts rejected the plaintiffs' requests that
three-judge federal panels be convened, because the innkeeper and
landlord were both private parties, and in neither case did the plain-
tiff seek to join a state or a local officer as a party defendant.'" The
Hall decision noted that although the landlord may be performing a
state function, for purposes of the "state action" requirement, "this
does not mean that he becomes a state officer for purposes of section
2281—`an enactment technical in the strict sense of the word and to
be applied as such! ""T It seems clear, however, that plaintiffs seeking
to prevent private parties from seizing property pursuant to a state
"self-help" statute, without notice or a prior hearing, will have little
success in obtaining a three-judge court to hear their claims. In such
cases the plaintiff should seek a declaratory judgment from a single-
judge district court. For, as the court in Hall observed in declining the
plaintiff's request for a three-judge panel: "[W]e do not deprive the
plaintiffs of an opportunity for an effective remedy. The one-Judge
Court can certainly give this [claim] the expeditious treatment that
is required."'
CoNcLusiorr
The current trend of judicial decisions extending the Sniadach
rationale beyond the context of wage garnishment and applying it to
state statutes permitting prejudgment attachment of other forms of
property portends further such extensions in the future.'" Inevitably,
113 430 F.2d at 442.
114 The Klim court observed:
[N]umerous cases have relaxed this requirement [that the relief sought run
against a state officer] by authorizing the convening of a statutory three-judge
Court when an injunction is sought to restrain a local officer from performing
a function embodying a policy of statewide concern or where the issue involved
has statewide application
315 F. Supp. at 113 (Emphasis in original.). Accord, Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge,
395 U.S. 89, 93 (1935). Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose, 313 F. Supp.
1, 2-3 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
116 Hall v. Gerson, 430 F.2d 430, 443 (5th Cir. 1970).
110 Id. at 442-43; Klim v. Jones, 315 F. , Supp. 109, 113 (ND. Cat 1970).
117 430 F.2d at 442.
118 Id. at 443.
119 The decisions discussed in this comment may acquire increased significance in
light of several actions which have recently been filed seeking to have declared uncon-
stitutional, on the authority of Sniadach, Section 9-503, the "self-help" repossession pro-
vision, of the Uniform Commercial Code. E.g., Michaelson v. Walter Laev, Inc., Civil
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most, if not all, provisions permitting seizure of property without
notice and a prior opportunity to be heard will succumb to constitu-
tional challenges. Conceivably the legislatures of the various statutes
could re-draft all extant prejudgment attachment provisions so as to
provide for some "meaningful" notice and prior hearing, consonant
with "the rudiments of due process." However, requiring adherence
to procedural due process in every situation in which prejudgment
attachment of property is sought would impose an oppressive burden
upon state judicial systems. Given this prospect, the need for a
thorough reappraisal of the value of prejudgment attachment statutes
seems evident. It is submitted that such a reappraisal will disclose
that their questionable utility could not possibly justify the astro-
nomical costs of their retention. Accordingly, all prejudgment attach-
ment provisions should be abolished, with the exception of those
protecting an overriding state or creditor interest and which are
narrowly drawn so as to be applicable only when that interest is
threatened. The policy of allowing private individuals to seek uni-
lateral settlement of their claims with the full sanction and authority
of the state harbors vast potential for disruption, inequity and abuse.
Subject to the exceptions noted above, the preferable procedure
would be to compel all creditors to seek satisfaction of their claims
through the conventional adjudicatory processes.
ROBERT T. NAGLE
No. 70-c-249 (ED. Wis., filed May 6, 1970). Since this provision clearly makes no
provision either for notice to the debtor or for a prior hearing on the creditor's claim,
the resolution of these cases will foreseeably focus upon the question of whether Sec-
tion 9-503 of the Code responds to some "situation requiring special protection to a
state creditor interest," as expressed by the Sniadach Court, and whether, assuming that
this is found to be the case, the provision is "narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual
condition."
The validity of section 9-503 in terms of the first criterion is dubious, and recon-
ciliation with the second seems impossible. The provision is so broadly drawn as to
allow repossession whenever the secured party deems the debtor to be in "default."
Since what constitutes a default is a matter of contractual agreement between the
parties, the term can encompass virtually any deviation from the contract terms, whether
or not a vital or significant interest is threatened. In any event, a final determination
of the validity of section 9-503 awaits decision by the courts.
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